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On Sunday 25 April 2015, one day after 
the ruling Conseil National Pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour 
la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-
FDD) party designated incumbent 
president Nkurunziza as its candidate 
for the presidential elections, people 
started taking to the streets in several 
neighbourhoods in Bujumbura to 
protest against the president’s ambition 
to pursue a third mandate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After more than two weeks of demonstrations 
met by fierce repression by the police, on 13 
May a dissident group within the armed forces 
under the command of general Godefroid 
Niyombare attempted a coup. At the time, 
President Nkurunziza was in Dar es Salaam 
attending a regional summit about the Burundi 
crisis. Less than 48 hours later, it became clear 
that the plotters had failed to overthrow the 
government. These events, and earlier 
intimidation in the northern countryside, 
sparked massive refugee streams into 
neighbouring countries. While President 
Nkurunziza managed to re-establish control 
over the security forces, the demonstrations and 
their violent repression, in which the privately 
owned media were also specifically targeted, 
continued. The security situation worsened, with 
regular grenade attacks in Bujumbura and the 
assassination of opposition politician Zedi 
Ferudi. In the meantime, the international 
community, especially regional players, failed to 
come to a harmonised position on the third 
term issue. However, by mid-May there was a 
large international consensus that the prevailing 
conditions were not conducive to holding 
elections. Several key donors withdrew their 
financial support for the electoral process and 
the elections were postponed. 
Neither Nkurunziza’s candidacy, nor the 
protests or the coup came as a surprise. As the 
first section of this brief will show, the issues at 
the heart of the current crisis are the 
culmination of several dynamics of contestation 
and conflict that have emerged in particular 
since the 2010 elections. But they are also rooted 
in broader frustrations related to the kind of 
politics embodied by the CNDD-FDD system 
since it came to power. This contribution will 
also situate the crisis within a broader analysis of 
the post-war peace and state-building project in 
Burundi, focusing on a number of key 
unresolved problems. To conclude, it will 
present a brief analysis of the protest movement 
and look into the specific questions the pre-
electoral crisis raises for future Burundian 
leaders and the international community. 
  
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 2 
#1 
September 2009 
ANATOMY OF A CRISIS LONG IN THE MAKING 
1. The fallout of the 2010 elections 
Burundi’s 2010 elections were considered an 
important test in several aspects. For the 
international community, which has 
accompanied Burundi’s transition since the 
signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000, these 
second post-war elections constituted a crucial 
step in consolidating the considerable progress 
achieved so far in peacebuilding and 
democratisation. For the incumbent President 
Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party, the 
elections meant exposure to the electorate after 
five years in power marred by institutional 
instability, both at the level of government and 
parliament and within the party itself. The 
party’s behaviour towards the opposition 
became increasingly authoritarian, and 
opposition parties, including the freshly 
demobilised former Forces Nationales de 
Libération (FNL) rebellion, hoped that the 
unconvincing performance by the CNDD-FDD 
would reinforce their own position in the 
political landscape. 
But even though they were deemed sufficiently 
free and fair by various electoral observation 
missions, the 2010 elections turned out to be 
less than successful in terms of democratic 
gains.1  Nor did they contribute to consolidating 
progress in the field of peace and security since 
the end of the war. As soon as the results of the 
communal elections hinted at a major victory for 
the CNDD-FDD, most opposition parties 
decided to withdraw their participation in the 
parliamentary and presidential elections.2 These 
                                                                  
1 Palmans, Eva, Burundi's 2010 elections: democracy 
and peace at risk?, ECES paper, 2012, 
http://www.eces.eu/images/documents/Burundi_E
lections_Eva_Palmans.pdf 
2 The communal elections were the first in a series 
that covered all levels of government, from 
presidency to hill chiefs, spread over several months. 
The campaign for the communal elections didn’t 
parties, united under the Alliance for 
Democratic Change (ADC-Ikibiri) umbrella, 
were however unable to convince the 
international community that the elections had 
been rigged. As a result, their boycott heralded 
not just the beginning of an electoral crisis, with 
violence that would last well into 2011, but in 
the longer run paved the way for CNDD-FDD 
and President Nkurunziza to further a quasi-
monopolistic hold on the country’s institutions.3  
As a concise overview of major events and 
dynamics in the Burundian political landscape 
shows, the 2010 post-electoral crisis almost 
seamlessly crossed over into the 2015 pre-
electoral unrest. 
In the weeks and months following the 2010 
elections, opposition militants, blamed for the 
violence, faced severe repression by the state’s 
security and intelligence services and clashed 
with militants of the CNDD-FDD. In a climate 
marked by reports of extrajudicial executions, 
harassment and persecution of opposition 
militants, several opposition leaders, including 
FNL’s Agathon Rwasa and Alexis Sinduhije left 
the country.4  At the same time, until well into 
2012, a number of relatively minor armed 
movements emerged, often clashing with police 
and army across the border from neighbouring 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. 
When the intensity of post electoral violence 
and opposition repression had somewhat 
                                                                                                       
focus on local issues but was centered on parties and 
their presidential candidates. 
3 CNDD-FDD won over 80% of seats in parliament. 
President Nkurunziza faced no competition after the 
boycott, and won by over 90% of the votes cast, in a 
turnout that was significantly lower than in the local 
elections. 
4  International Crisis Group: Burundi: From 
Electoral Boycott To Political Impasse. Africa 
Report N°169, 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/c
entral-africa/burundi/169%20Burundi%20-
%20From%20Electoral%20Boycott%20to%20Politi
cal%20Impasse%20ENGLISH.pdf 
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diminished, administrative repression increased. 
It has been near impossible for opposition 
parties to get permission to organise public 
meetings, and ignoring this ban resulted in 
clashes with security forces, and even life 
sentences for a number of Mouvement pour la 
solidarité et le développement (MSD) militants 
in March 2014.5  The ministry of the interior 
also adopted a tactic of profound meddling in 
opposition parties’ internal matters. The most 
notable targets were FNL’s Agathon Rwasa, 
who returned to Burundi in August 2013, and 
Union pour le Progrès National’s (UPRONA) 
Charles Nditije, who as legitimate leaders were 
disconnected from the legally recognised wings 
of their parties. 
In another effort by CNDD-FDD to dominate 
and control the public sphere, new legislation on 
media and on public gatherings was introduced. 
Even if these laws didn’t dramatically affect the 
role that activists and privately owned media 
continued to play, these measures were 
indicative of the further deterioration of the 
CNDD-FDD government’s relationship with 
media and civil society watchdogs, who 
increasingly took on a role as de facto political 
counter powers in the absence of a functional 
parliamentary opposition. 
Opposition parties, themselves divided, have not 
been able to respond to the shared challenges 
they faced after the boycott, let alone transform 
the ADC-Ikibri into a performing vehicle with a 
common programme and a single candidate, as 
was initially proposed. By early 2015, it seemed 
to have been eclipsed by a new ‘historical’ 
coalition between Rwasa’s FNL and Nditije’s 
UPRONA, leaders of two parties that were 
arch-enemies during the war. 
                                                                  
5 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/
08/201381172611527791.html; 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26681586 ; 
The preparations for the electoral process itself 
were also fraught with difficulty and 
contestation, in particular over the composition 
of the Commission Electorale Nationale 
Indépendante (CENI), and later over the way 
the voter registration process had been handled. 
Neither the opposition nor international 
partners were reassured about the independent 
character of the commission. 
The international community, well aware of the 
risks this build-up of tension held for the 2015 
elections, struggled to find a harmonised and 
adequate response to these early warning signals. 
Finding itself caught between, on the one hand, 
its endorsement of the 2010 election outcome, 
respect for Burundi's sovereignty and the 
prioritisation of stability over democratic 
deepening, and on the other, its dissatisfaction 
and concern over the government's increasingly 
illiberal and authoritarian tendencies, the 
international community has resorted to a 
largely tongue-tied diplomatic approach. 
One notable intervention was the series of 
roundtables initiated in 2013 under the auspices 
of the United Nations Office in Burundi 
(BNUB). This initiative resulted in an electoral 
roadmap for 2015, agreed upon by all political 
actors including the government and CENI, 
with propositions for a fair and favourable 
electoral climate. However, the government 
either did not implement crucial measures, or 
only implemented them superficially, and the 
follow-up by the international community 
remained casual at best. 
By mid-2014, the temperature in Burundi’s 
political landscape was constantly on the rise. 
Ongoing reports by local activists and privately 
owned media of armament and military training 
by CNDD-FDD militants, as well as other 
scandals involving the CNDD-FDD elite, 6 
                                                                  
6 Most notable was the case of the murder of three 
Italian nuns in Kamenge in September 2014. The 
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resulted in the detention of iconic human rights 
activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa and journalist 
Bob Rugurika of the equally iconic RPA radio 
station. Both were eventually released after 
considerable international pressure. Upon the 
release of Rugurika, an unprecedented number 
of people took to the streets in Bujumbura and 
beyond in support of the journalist – an 
important precursor to the anti-third-term 
protests. A number of sometimes spectacular 
events and dynamics unfolded, including the 
brutally suppressed incursion of an unidentified 
rebel group in the northern Cibitoke province,7 
and the escape of Hussein Radjabu, former 
powerful president of the CNDD-FDD, ousted 
by Nkurunziza in 2007 and serving a sentence 
for plotting against the security of the state. 
These events contributed to an accelerated 
build-up in tension and were also indicative of 
both the increasing rifts within the CNDD-
FDD and of the increased willingness to 
publicly express dissatisfaction. Importantly, the 
powerful Catholic Church had also very 
explicitly embarked on a campaign against a 
third mandate for Nkurunziza. One of the most 
remarkable developments in this period was the 
mounting internal dissatisfaction within the 
CNDD-FDD.8  While there have always been 
considerable cleavages between former rebels 
and civilian members joining after the war, this 
time the rift affected the movement’s military 
elite itself. In November 2014, Adolphe 
Nshimirimana (head of the national intelligence 
services or SNR) and Alain Guillaume Bunyoni 
(chief of cabinet under the Nkurunziza 
presidency), both kingpin generals in the 
                                                                                                       
popular RPA radio station’s investigations pointed 
towards the involvement of General Adolphe 
Nshimirimana, one of the strongmen of the 
Nkurunziza regime. 
7 http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/12/burundi-
summary-executions-army-police 
8  http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/a-house-
divided-in-burundi-rifts-at-the-heart-of-the-ruling-
party. 
CNDD-FDD system and associated with 
various scandals, were dismissed. 9 
Nshimirimana’s successor at the SNR, 
Godefroid Niyombare, also a former 
commander in the FDD rebellion, underwent 
the same fate when a document he had drafted 
warning against the dangers of an 
unconstitutional third term for President 
Nkurunziza went public. Unsurprisingly, later on 
Niyombare was one of the leaders of the 13 May 
coup. Moreover, in March, dozens of often 
senior CNDD-FDD members who had 
remained on the periphery of the real power 
centre in the party but nevertheless had a lot to 
lose signed a petition against an additional term 
for Nkurunziza. The latter managed to close the 
ranks, secure his candidacy and prepare the 
party for elections, but the fragility of the 
CNDD-FDD system had been widely exposed 
to the public, and this strengthened the resolve 
of the president’s opponents. 
2. Arusha’s unresolved problems 
It is clear that the 2010 electoral crisis deeply 
polarised the political landscape in Burundi. But 
as the following section will show, more 
structural factors also underlie the dynamics of 
conflict we are seeing today. While Burundi’s 
post-war trajectory, based on the Arusha 
Agreement’s power-sharing principles, has been 
lauded as one of the good examples of post-war 
peace and state building, the shadow sides of 
this success story quickly emerged. Several areas 
of intervention in the peace building project, 
such as democratisation, support to civil society, 
and also the question of returning refugees and 
land reform, have themselves become important 
arenas of contestation and conflict. Moreover, a 
number of important problems have remained 
                                                                  
9  http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/cinq-clefs-pour-
comprendre-le-depart-de-guillaume-bunyoni-et-
adolphe-nshimirimana/ 
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unresolved by Arusha.10 A closer examination of 
power distribution and governance practices 
after the war in Burundi shows that the peace 
building enterprise, while nonetheless 
transformative in many important aspects, has 
not been able to bring about a fundamentally 
new way of doing politics. Not only have the re-
appropriation of peace building objectives and 
interventions by elites contributed to the 
entrenchment of a neo-patrimonial political 
economy,11 but the prioritisation by donors of 
relative stability has also contributed to the 
persistence of violence and militarism.12 In many 
ways, the CNDD-FDD repertoire, with its 
reliance on authoritarian methods, the 
persistence of militarism and obsessive control 
of the public sphere, echoes the practices of the 
old UPRONA regime it once fought. The 
following paragraphs will deal with some of the 
structural continuities that have crossed into the 
post-war era. 
Partisan identities and patronage 
The Arusha Agreement’s famous article that 
deals with the analysis of the nature of the 
conflict in Burundi.states that ‘the conflict is 
fundamentally political, with extremely 
important ethnic dimensions and that it stems 
from a struggle of the political class to accede to 
and/or remain in power.’ 13  To resolve these 
                                                                  
10 For an excellent discussion of power sharing and 
the legacy of the Arusha Agreement, see 
Vandeginste, S: Arusha at 15: reflections on power-
sharing, peace and transition in Burundi, IOB 
Working Paper, 2015, 
https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/c
ontainer2143/files/Publications/DP/2015/01-
vandeginste.pdf 
11 Uvin & Bayer (2013). ‘The Political Economy of 
Statebuilding in Burundi’. In Berdal and Zaum (eds), 
Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after 
Peace. Abingdon: Routledge 
12 Curtis D. (2013), ‘The international peace-building 
paradox: power sharing and post-conflict governance 
in Burundi’, African Affairs, 112, 446: 72-91 
13 Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in 
Burundi, Protocol I, Chapter I, Article 4, 
problems, the Arusha Agreement and the 
constitution based on it combine ethnic power-
sharing provisions – essentially quota-based 
guarantees that prevent the Tutsi minority being 
overpowered by Hutu majority rule – with 
electoral democratisation. 
Much of the applause Burundi has initially 
received for its post-war reconciliation efforts 
can be credited to the remarkable progress that 
has been made in reducing ethnic tensions. The 
power-sharing principles of Arusha have 
undoubtedly played an important role in this.14  
On the other hand, as the previous section has 
shown, and the determination of Nkurunziza to 
pursue another presidential term continues to 
demonstrate, the core political problem of elite 
capture of the state has not been resolved by 
Arusha. And the diminished importance of 
ethnicity also does not mean that identity 
politics are no longer part of the repertoire of 
those political elites. 
In the process of democratisation that started 
after the agreement, there has been a 
proliferation of political parties. In the 2010 
elections there were over 40 parties in 
competition. Only a minority of these parties are 
viable. However, partisan identities have become 
one of the most prominent fault lines in 
Burundi today, along which political and 
economic inclusion and exclusion is organised. 
A number of parties have obviously been better 
equipped to construct these identities and 
develop a viable, sound, grassroots base. Parties 
with a long pedigree in Burundi like UPRONA 
and Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi 
(FRODEBU) have loyal militants who, for 
various reasons, strongly identify with the party. 
                                                                                                       
http://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreement
s/No%201%20arusha.pdf 
14  Interestingly, much of the demystification of 
ethnicity in recent years in Burundi is also connected 
to the way political competition and violence are 
now mainly being played out among parties with a 
predominantly Hutu profile. 
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Newcomer MSD has managed to establish itself 
in the political marketplace with an assertive, 
and to many in Burundi, aggressive style, 
speaking to the lifestyles and aspirations of 
urban and educated youth. The most outspoken 
and deep-rooted construction of party identities 
can be found with CNDD-FDD and FNL, who 
both rely on their rebellious past. 
Where ethnic and regional fault lines determined 
the inequalities in distribution of state resources 
that led to conflict in the single-party state era,15 
patronage is now increasingly structured along 
partisan lines. Since its electoral victory in 2005, 
and even more so since the opposition boycott 
of the 2010 elections, the CNDD-FDD party 
has exercised a quasi-monopoly over the state 
and its resources. As such, it has been able to 
build, from top to bottom, a system of 
patronage around its own party structures. On 
all scales and levels, affiliation to these structures 
has become the main factor for acquiring access 
to state resources. Being part – or not – of what 
is commonly called ‘le système’ considerably 
determines livelihoods and opportunities for 
Burundians today, for example, whether they are 
able to benefit from subsidised agricultural 
inputs at the hill level, have a chance at 
employment at any level of public 
administration, are granted scholarships to study 
abroad or wish to set up a private enterprise or 
keep it in business. 
This has become an important source of 
frustration for many people who do not want to 
adhere to the CNDD-FDD and more so for 
known sympathisers of other parties. But it is 
also an increasing problem for CNDD-FDD 
itself, as not all members have been able to 
benefit in the same way from their association 
                                                                  
15 Ndikumana, L: Distributional conflict, the state, 
and peace building in Burundi, working paper,2005 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1055&context=econ_workingpaper 
with the party. 16  Again, this internal 
dissatisfaction occurs on all levels, as became 
clear in the ‘frondeur’ dissident movement that 
emerged in March 2015. 
Militarised politics 
Partisan identities are not only important for 
understanding processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, but are also mobilised into various 
forms of violent political agency, as has become 
clear in recent years. Thus they also play a role 
in another major issue that Arusha has not been 
able to resolve: the militarisation of politics and 
the use of coercion and violence by political 
actors competing for power. 
The phenomenon most associated with post-
war identity politics and political violence are the 
Imbonerakure17 – the CNDD-FDD’s vanguard 
youth league. Many of the thousands of 
members of the league don’t fit in to the general 
representation of this group as an armed and 
dangerous militia, and are more involved in 
participation in public work campaigns and 
propaganda activities than in violence. But there 
is undeniably a hardcore of former combatants, 
especially in the countryside, who have 
increasingly played a central role in policing 
public space, extortion and intimidation of 
opposition militants in recent years. There is 
little doubt that several of the Imbonerakure 
groups operating locally have access to arms, 
and there are several credible reports that some 
contingents have been specifically formed, 
armed and trained for combat, both in South 
Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
in Burundi. 
                                                                  
16 Author interviews with CNDD-FDD militants in 
2011–2014 
17 Kirundi for ‘those who see ahead’. During the war, 
Imbonerakure youth carried out logistical support 
and reconnaissance operations for the FDD 
rebellion. 
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However seriously their capacity for violence 
should be taken, it makes little sense to regard 
the Imbonerakure phenomenon in an isolated 
way. Rather than being linked to the army itself, 
the militarisation of the CNDD-FDD regime is 
determined by institutions, networks and 
individuals rooted in its former existence as a 
rebel movement. These ‘old-boys’ networks 
cross the boundaries between executive 
institutions, the army, security and intelligence 
services and party structures, and stretch from 
the level of high ranking elites close to President 
Nkurunziza, to the former combatants of the 
FDD rebellion at the grassroots level. At the 
nexus of this entanglement between official and 
informal networks is a small group of former 
FDD rebel commanders, commonly referred to 
as ‘the generals’. 18   These individuals around 
Nkurunziza also play an important role in 
Burundi’s post-war political economy, as they 
are at the top of the food chain in the patronage 
networks linked to CNDD-FDD. 
While Burundian and international activists have 
mostly focused on the Imbonerakure as the 
main source for recent violence, the post-war 
militarisation of politics cannot be attributed 
solely to the CNDD-FDD and its rebel legacy. 
Other political actors have also maintained a 
capacity for violence. Since the 2010 elections, a 
number of armed insurgent groups have 
surfaced. Some have been associated with 
parties and politicians that took part in the 
electoral boycott, such as the FNL’s Agathon 
Rwasa and MSD’s Alexis Sinduhije.19 Most of 
                                                                  
18 The most notorious members of this group are the 
previously mentioned Adolphe Nshimirimana and 
Alain Guillaume Bunyoni. Both have been dismissed 
from their official posts but continue to play a 
crucial role. 
19  United Nations Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (GoE), 2010, Final 
Report: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44463706/UN-
Group-of-Experts-Report-November-2010   and 
2011, final report: 
these groups operated across the borders with 
neighbouring Tanzania and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, sometimes venturing in the 
Rukoko reserve or the Kibira forest. By 2012, 
almost all these groups had dissolved or been 
neutralised by the Burundian armed forces. 
However, the FNL-Nzabampema faction in 
South Kivu, which before MONUSCO-led 
operations against them in early 2015 was 
reported to consist of over 300 combatants, 
continues to operate under the command of 
FDN defectors with a historic background in 
FNL.20 Their presence has caused insecurity on 
both sides of the border in the Ruzizi plain. 
CONTESTATION AND COUP 
By the end of April, it became clear that Burundi 
would be the next African country to experience 
large-scale popular protest. Demonstrations had 
been called for by civil society organisations and 
opposition parties, but were clearly driven by 
urban youth, and tacitly supported by larger 
parts of society. While it is still early to draw 
conclusions, some observations of these 
protests raise a number of pertinent questions 
about ‘what comes next’. 
Firstly, the demonstrations in several 
neighbourhoods of Bujumbura were sparked by 
the announcement of the president’s candidacy. 
But there is little doubt that the protests are 
fuelled by a much broader set of grievances and 
frustrations, most notably the lack of economic 
and social perspectives, and the increased sense 
of insecurity caused by the system described 
above. Thus the protests should not only be 
regarded as a way to rescue the Arusha 
                                                                                                       
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=S/2011/738 
20 For a more in-depth discussion on the background 
of this group and operations against this group, see 
Verweijen, J: ‘Understanding the recent operation 
against the FNL/Nzabampema’,2015, 
http://congosiasa.blogspot.be/2015/01/guest-blog-
understanding-recent.html 
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Agreement and its clear rulings on presidential 
term limits, but also as a response to the 
problems Arusha did not manage to resolve: 
elite capture of the state, corruption, militarism, 
patronage and exclusion. 
Secondly, while popular uprisings are not a new 
phenomenon in Africa, and the series of street 
protests in several African countries in recent 
years can be seen as part of a third wave of 
African protest,21 it should be noted that, some 
exceptions aside, Burundi has no significant 
tradition of mass demonstrations. Especially in 
the post-war era, the protests, which so far have 
been largely devoid of partisan displays, might 
well mark a generational shift and constitute ‘a 
new way of doing politics’, an alternative to 
armed struggle as the only means of resistance.22  
In the words of one participant: ‘From now on, 
leaders will realise that the street will always be a 
way to contest their power.’23 However, in the 
face of brutal police repression, the nonviolent 
character of the protests has come under 
pressure. Especially since the coup attempt, 
some protestors have claimed and procured 
arms to defend themselves. If the stand-off 
continues, it is not unlikely that new rebellions 
could be formed, this time with a larger 
potential for recruitment than in the aftermath 
of the 2010 elections. 
Thirdly, the government has been quick to 
depict the protests as a marginal phenomenon, 
concentrated in a few urban areas but not 
affecting the rest of the country, and CNDD-
FDD propagandists branded the protests as a 
                                                                  
21 In relation to the anti-colonial struggle and the 
early 1990s democratisation movements, see Branch, 
A. & Mampilly, Z. (2015): Africa Uprising. Popular 
Protest and political change, African Arguments. 
London: Zed Books. 
22  Mamdani, M. ‘An African reflection on Tahrir 
Square’, 
http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/featur
es/73187 
23 Author’s correspondence with participants in the 
protest. 
phenomenon of Tutsi neighbourhoods. These 
claims don’t do justice to reality. In several of 
these neighbourhoods, Hutu youth from the 
hills and plains surrounding the capital have 
joined the protest. Unsurprisingly, in one of the 
world’s least urbanised countries, protests have 
been largely a phenomenon of the capital. 
However, there have also been, on a more 
modest scale, but nevertheless persistently, 
several demonstrations in rural areas, from 
Bururi to Ngozi, suggesting that the narrative of 
the Nkurunziza’s rural popularity should be 
somewhat readjusted. 
Finally, the failed, and according to some, fake 
coup attempt,24 was also a clear reminder of the 
potential for a militarisation of the contestation 
dynamic. Not only was it detrimental to the 
momentum of the demonstrations, and caused 
more violent repression of the protestors, it also 
laid bare significant divisions within the armed 
forces. Even when the FDN’s recent track 
record became somewhat flawed,25 there was a 
consensus that the reform of the army in 
Burundi, based on integrating the former armed 
forces with the fighters forming the rebel 
movements, had been a success story, further 
illustrated by its role in African peacekeeping 
missions like AMISOM in Somalia.26 During and 
after the 2010 electoral contestation, when the 
army was deployed in several hotspots like the 
FNL-stronghold Bujumbura Rural, it was lauded 
for its neutral role, and at least until the coup 
attempt, this also seemed to be the case for the 
                                                                  
24 http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2838p02
0.xml0/ 
25  Most notably the Burundian army’s shady 
presence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and its implication in the extrajudicial executions of 
captured and disarmed rebels in Cibitoke (Human 
Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/12/burundi-
summary-executions-army-police ) 
26 Ndayiziga, C. Enjeux autour de l’intervention du 
Burundi en Somalie, Egmont Africa Policy Brief, 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/APB7.pdf 
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way the army had handled the anti-Nkurunziza 
demonstrations. Since the coup, this neutrality 
has come under pressure. Moreover, the 
cleavages and dissatisfaction manifest in the 
army could lead to a new coup attempt, or feed 
into other forms of armed resistance in the 
absence of a solution to the third term question. 
CONCLUSION  
Fifteen years after the Arusha Agreement, and 
ten years into Burundi’s post-war 
democratisation process, there are serious 
concerns that Burundi’s once much-applauded 
progress in reconciliation and state building 
could be reversed. As expected, after the 2010 
crisis, the 2015 elections have also proven to be 
a serious test for Burundi’s post-war 
transformation.  
On the one hand, while many warned about a 
return to ethnic tensions and large scale 
violence, and the CNDD-FDD increasingly 
played the ethnic card, events so far have rather 
confirmed the diminished importance of ethnic 
divisions after Arusha. This is clearly shown by 
the coalition between former enemies FNL and 
UPRONA, and even more so by the multi-
ethnic nature of the protests. Moreover, the 
largely non-partisan, non-violent and citizen 
nature of the protest movement hints at the 
desire for a more emancipatory form of 
democracy, which breaks with the political 
patterns that have reproduced exclusion and 
violence in the wake of the war. 
However, the crisis also raises important 
questions and challenges, both for Burundian 
leaders and in terms of international response. 
In the short term, there is a considerable risk of 
a militarisation of the contestation movement, 
which could take on many forms and manifest 
itself on various scales, ranging from urban 
guerrilla attacks to regional conflict. Apart from 
a negotiated solution to the third mandate 
problem, the risk of further violent escalation 
could be defused by restoring faith in the 
electoral process as a means to achieve political 
change. In order to do so, even taking the 
minimum number of measures will require 
much more time than the modest 
postponements that have so far been on the 
table. These measures would include the 
creation of a new, truly independent national 
electoral commission, restoring the 
infrastructures of privately owned media and 
ensuring they can operate freely, guaranteeing 
equal access to the public sphere all over the 
country for all political parties and politicians, 
ensuring the security of opposition leaders and 
facilitating the return of refugees. This means 
that if these measures are to be implemented, a 
solution will have to be found to bridge the 
period between the constitutional deadline of 26 
August for a president to be sworn in, and new 
elections. This will be a very tough sell for 
Nkurunziza and his supporters. Moreover, for 
such confidence-building measures to be 
credible in the eyes of opposition and 
protestors, serious engagement from the 
international community, including active 
implication in oversight and monitoring 
mechanisms, would be required. 
In the longer term, there are other, more 
fundamental questions that need the attention of 
future Burundian leaders and their international 
partners. Fifteen years of peace building and a 
decade of formal multiparty democracy have not 
been able to transform the nature of state power 
and its relationship with society. At the time of 
writing, it is unclear how and when the electoral 
process will proceed. However, it is clear that 
whatever settlement or order results from the 
current stand-off will not only need to reply to 
the immediate grievances of the street but also 
address some of the structural unresolved 
problems of peace building that underlie the 
current dynamics of contestation and conflict. 
Donors and regional actors should be more 
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sensitive to the long-term problems that result 
from their prioritisation of stability. 
Tomas Van Acker is a Research Fellow at the 
Conflict Research Group of Ghent University 
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